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This article presents what I consider to be ten essential homeland security 
books. The list is personal and provisional. The discipline is too new to 
have a canon. We need to continuously examine what is signal and what is 
background noise in homeland security's academic environment. 
Much has been written about homeland security. A lot more is in the 
publishing pipeline. My list includes books I find myself returning to as I 
seek to understand contemporary homeland security events. Beyond 
personal interest, I believe they form a foundation for a growing 
understanding of the parameters of what it means to study homeland 
security as a professional discipline. Other books – and important articles 
– could be added, but ten is sufficient to start. 
These books are: 
• The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States: 9/11  Commission Report (2004) 
• The National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) 
• After: How America Confronted the September 12 Era (2003) 
• Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (2004) 
• America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us 
From Terrorism (2004) 
• Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, Preventing, 
and Surviving Terrorism (2005) 
• Catastrophe Preparation and Prevention for Law Enforcement 
Professionals (2008) 
• Trapped in the War on Terror (2006) 
• Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy; Strengthening Ourselves 
(2006) 
• The Declaration of Independence (1776), The Articles of Confederation 
(1777), and The Constitution of the United States of America (1787) 
Taken together, these works outline a broad historical narrative about 
homeland security. We were attacked. We quickly developed a strategy to 
make sure we prevented future attacks. We tried to come to terms with 
what happened to us as a nation. Next, textbooks and workbooks aiming to 
systematize homeland security ideas started to appear. Homeland security 
took the first steps toward becoming institutionalized. Then came the 
criticism of how we perceived the enemy and what we were doing – or not 
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doing – to protect the homeland. Recently, some people maintain we have 
significantly overreacted to the threat and are now “trapped” in a War on 
Terror that accomplishes little, wastes resources and threatens our 
national values. Others urge government to focus resources on threats that 
have the potential to cause us the greatest damage and to encourage 
communities to become resilient.  The American people must be willing to 
accept some level of risk.  While there is a threat of attack by terrorists, 
there is a bigger danger that how we react will do more damage than the 
attack.  As one of the authors cited later in this essay wrote: “Instead of 
surrendering our liberties in the name of security, we must embrace liberty 
as the source and sustenance of our security.”  Homeland security gets 
better through the open exchange of competing and contrasting ideas.  
Keeping this essential debate open and free helps ensure we will remain an 
“Unconquerable Nation.” 
The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States: 9/11 Commission Report1 
Not many government reports are literary enough to be nominated for the 
National Book Award. The 9/11 Report was.2 The Report chronicles the 
events that led to a perceived need for something called homeland 
security. It provides an analysis of why we were attacked and why the 
attack succeeded. It outlines what the nation needs to do to reduce the 
chances that we will be unprepared for another attack. It provides 
continually relevant benchmarks against which to assess the status of 
efforts to protect the nation from terrorism. 
The book begins with a prosaically clinical retelling of what happened 
on a day that "dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the Eastern 
United States." [1] Chapter One ends with a quote from an unknown 
NORAD member who observes "This is a new type of war."   
In an extended flashback, the authors use Chapters Two through Eight 
to discuss the foundations of this new type of war. They focus on the 
origins and rise of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.  They detail how al 
Qaeda prepared for the attack. They present the reader with a portrait of 
the enemy as "sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal." It is the 
chilling image that persists today.  The nation continues to struggle to 
understand who the enemy is and what it wants.   
The report describes how  
[T]he institutions charged with protecting our borders, civil 
aviation, and national security did not understand how grave this 
threat could be, and did not adjust their policies, plans and 
practices to deter or defeat it. We learned of fault lines within our 
government – between foreign and domestic intelligence, and 
between and within agencies. We learned of the pervasive 
problems of managing and sharing information across a large and 
unwieldy government that had been built in a different era to 
confront different dangers. [xvii]   
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According to the Report Card issued by the vestiges of the 911 Commission 
and to the “First 100 Days” agenda of the 110th Congress, many of those 
institutional problems persist. 
The 9/11 Report concludes the attack happened because of the failure of 
imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. It is interesting 
(although understandable from a political perspective) that the 
Commission chose to focus on the failure of "management" rather than 
"leadership." Usually when big things go wrong leaders, not managers, are 
responsible. The Commission avoided making a judgment about how and 
which leaders failed.  
The 9/11 Report tetrad creates a framework for assessing preparedness: 
Do we have the right policies? Do we have the capabilities to execute those 
policies? Do we have the appropriate leadership in homeland security?  Do 
we encourage and use imagination where it can do the most good? 
Homeland security efforts since the Report was published have focused 
primarily on improving response capabilities and on policy. Much less 
emphasis has been placed on what it means to be an effective homeland 
security leader, or on systematically developing those leaders. It is unclear 
how to – or whether we should – institutionalize imagination. There 
continues to be more basic homeland security work to do than anyone, 
including contractors, has time to do well.  One can barely wonder what a 
more imaginative workload would look like.  On the other hand, there is a 
growing view (discussed later in this essay) that perhaps we have become 
more imaginative about the terrorist threat than is warranted by the 
empirical evidence.    
The 9/11 report was criticized almost the same day it was released.3 But 
the report – along with the transcripts and audio and video recordings of 
the testimony that contributed to the Commission's findings – will remain 
a historically important artifact as long as homeland security remains a 
function of government. The 9/11 Report is essential because it reminds us 
what life was like before and on that singular Tuesday in September. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security4 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security is one of the first 
comprehensive efforts to describe a domestic public policy strategy. 
Formal strategy documents are routine in the Department of Defense and 
national security world. They are less prevalent in the domestic policy 
arena. 
There are extensive debates about what a strategy is.5 I find it useful to 
consider strategy as both intentional and emergent.6 The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security is intentional.  We were attacked.  We 
had to respond.  What should we do?  One approach would be simply to 
have individual agencies decide what to do, then coordinate that effort 
through the usual government mechanisms. Another way is to coordinate 
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those efforts within a unified design. That is what the National Strategy 
intends to do.  
The Strategy is paved with good intentions.  But in my experience it is 
rarely referred to outside a relatively small circle of people and agencies.   
When it was first released it was criticized as less of a strategy and more a 
huge to-do list.   One critic said it had more activities than his daughter's 
summer camp.  A primary author of the Strategy responded that while 
that was an amusing debate point, "what I haven't heard is anyone say that 
we missed anything and I haven't heard anyone say that any of the 84 
[activities in the Strategy] don't matter."7  
The Strategy is a "theory for how we're going to cause security for 
ourselves."8 It aims to address four basic, and complex, questions: What is 
homeland security and what are its missions? What are we trying to 
accomplish and what are the most important goals? What is the national 
government doing now to achieve those goals and what should they be 
doing?  What should state, local, tribal, private sector entities, and citizens 
do to help make the nation secure?  
One definition of “strategy” says that it is the bridge between policy and 
operations.9 Clearly, this document is not that kind of strategy. There is no 
one place to go to find the national homeland security policy. Instead, the 
nation's homeland security policy has to be constructed retrospectively by 
aggregating laws, presidential directives, grant guidance, and other 
regulatory documents. The National Strategy is better seen as a Grand 
Strategy. It is "a high level statement of what we're trying to do."10 
One wonders what the relationship is between the strategy that is 
outlined in this document and the strategy that has emerged over the last 
few years. For example, the official definition of homeland security says 
"Homeland Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur." [2]. These are straight forward words. Homeland Security is about 
terrorism. The first strategic objective is to prevent terrorism. If it were not 
for terrorism, there would be no large-scale government activity called 
Homeland Security. There is nothing in the definition, and precious little 
in the strategy (maybe 5 percent), about all hazards, natural disasters, or 
pandemics.  
One should not be so doctrinaire to think that a written strategy is or 
should be the primary driver of government's behavior. The world did not 
stop after 9/11. Katrina demonstrated gaps in our response capabilities. 
Avian flu raised the specter of the 1918 pandemic and called attention to 
the inadequacies of our public health and medical care system. The real 
homeland security strategy that emerges in parallel with the written 
National Strategy seems to change priorities according to whatever the 
last disaster was or the next credible catastrophe might be. That is a 
reminder that what government does is shaped more by politics than 
paper.   
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The official Strategy does a number of structural things well. It 
describes – at the 50,000 foot level – the threats and where we are 
vulnerable to those threats. It outlines how the nation is organized to meet 
those threats, reminding readers of the role of federalism. It identifies six 
mission areas which, in July 2002, seemed especially critical: intelligence, 
border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, critical 
infrastructure, catastrophic threats, and emergency response. Five years 
later these issues still represent sources of national distress.   
The strategy describes what it terms four foundations that cut across all 
the mission areas: law, science and technology, information sharing, and 
international cooperation. It believes these foundations can be used as the 
basis for deciding where to invest resources. One could argue whether 
these are foundations, other mission areas, or the framework for the 
homeland security industrial complex. But they add to the effort to provide 
a comprehensive conceptual look at what it will take to prevent and 
respond to the next attack.   
A useful strategy describes ends, ways, and means.  The National 
Strategy does pay some attention to the costs of homeland security.  It 
notes we spend (as of 2002) roughly $100 billion a year on homeland 
security. It asserts that "as a Nation we will spend whatever is necessary to 
secure the homeland." [63] There is no evidence given to support the $100 
billion a year figure. Unless I missed it somewhere, there is no 
authoritative accounting anywhere of just how much homeland security 
costs the nation. There is little incentive to know. There is no mechanism – 
except perhaps Congress – for discovering. There is no agreed upon set of 
categories to establish what even counts as homeland security spending. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security is showing its age. There 
is a glaring gap between the strategy's emphasis on prevention and the 
financial and political support for response. According to the Strategy, 
homeland security is supposed to be almost exclusively about terrorism. 
Congressional hearings, budgets, assessments, and documents suggest 
homeland security increasingly is about all hazards.  
The National Strategy anticipates that it will be "adjusted and 
amended" over time. It is now appropriate that the nation develop a new 
strategy, based on the lessons we ought to have learned over the past five 
years. This should be one of the first items of business for a new congress 
and a new administration. But there is nothing that says a national 
strategy has to come from the central government. The National 
Governors Association, the National Homeland Security Consortium, 
National League of Cities, among others, are just as capable of initiating 
overall direction for the nation, especially in a networked world.    
While some of what is in the current Strategy should be changed, other 
elements should be carried over to version 2.0 – if not in specifics, at least 
in philosophy. For example, there are eight principles that guided the 
design of the first National Strategy:  
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 Require responsibility and accountability,  
 Mobilize the entire nation,  
 Manage risks and allocate resources judiciously,  
 Seek opportunities out of the adversity created by having to pay 
attention to terrorism, 
 Foster flexibility in the nation’s homeland security programs,  
 Measure preparedness,  
 Sustain preparedness, and  
 Constrain government spending.   
 
These may not be the only or the best principles to inform a national 
strategy. But they are worth considering for future iterations.   
For now, however, we work with the strategy we have. The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security is clear enough to say where we should be 
going, and flexible enough to encourage the nation to consider what it 
means to have an effective strategy. 
After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era, by 
Steven Brill11 
Here is the narrative so far: the nation was cruising along as the world's 
only super power. There were distant threats, but for the most part we 
were on top of history. All that was left was for everyone to get rich.  Then 
we were attacked by an enemy who had been at war with us for at least 
twenty years. This time they got our full attention. We developed a strategy 
for dealing with the enemy, and in the process began to reshape the nature 
of our government, its relationship to the world, and its relationship to its 
people. 
Steven Brill captures what happened during the period from September 
12, 2001 to January 2003. In a brief prologue he introduces the main 
characters in his story and what they were doing on September 11th.  Part 
One, called "Climbing Back," covers the period from September 12 through 
October 12, the first frightening and numbing month after the attack. Part 
Two, "New Routines, New Systems" describes October 15, 2001 to 
December 31, 2001. Part Three covers January 2 through June 10, 2002, a 
period of "Short Term Pain and Gain, Long Term Plans." Part Four, 
"Coming to Terms With The New Era" describes the period of June 12 
through September 11, 2002. The Epilogue closes the narrative in January 
2003.  
The story unfolds through the experiences of people. A customs 
inspector has to deal with how to make sure there is no nuclear bomb in 
his port. A California businessman who produces luggage screening 
devices sees the event as both a tragedy and as a business opportunity. 
BELLAVI T A, CH ANGING HOMELAND SECURI TY 
HO MELAND SECURI TY  AFFAIR S,  VOL. III,  NO. 1 (FEBR UAR Y  2007) H TT P://WWW.H S AJ.OR G 
7 
There is a sharp contrast between Attorney General Ashcroft – who wants 
to make sure nothing like this happens again and who authorizes the 
questioning and detaining of hundreds and maybe thousands of people – 
and the recently hired executive director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union, who tries to hold back efforts he perceives will corrode civil 
liberties. The chief executive of a major insurance company has to decide 
whether his company will pay or avoid insurance damages. The Red Cross 
director has to figure out how to collect and distribute unprecedented 
donations, and at the same time avoid attacks by her board of directors. A 
small business man – the owner of a shoe repair business – has to rebuild 
his business. A border patrol agent speaks publicly about his section of 
unprotected border and faces practically unending efforts by the 
bureaucracy to fire him. 
While all this is going on, Tom Ridge and a very small group of people 
develop first an Office of Homeland Security and then a Department of 
Homeland Security. There are many remarkable stories in this 700 page 
book.  The best one – for those with an interest in homeland security 
politics – may be the story of how Ridge and his group encounter 
bureaucratic, political, and other barriers while trying to create a new way 
of doing business in the executive and congressional branches.  
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was in a relative's hospital room 
when the planes attacked. A few days later he was selected to run the 
White House-based Office of Homeland Security and carry out a strategy 
that required coordinating other executive branch agencies. Brill describes 
the massive problems Ridge faced getting agencies to think beyond their 
organizational province. Ridge's relationship to those agencies changed 
after he was named to head the new Department of Homeland Security.   
But from his first days in Washington, having to respond to the threat of 
the day – from anthrax attacks to problems with unsecured manhole 
covers – created an environment that gave Ridge and his staff little 
opportunity to think deliberately and comprehensively about what needed 
to be done. One early member of DHS described the pace as "having to fly 
a plane while you're still building it."12 Brill illustrates how intention and 
happenstance combined to create that environment, one that continues to 
challenge the department. 
This collection of stories is essential to understanding homeland 
security's early days – not just the Department of Homeland Security, but 
the complexity that faced the nation and its leaders after the attack. It is a 
truism that those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it. It has 
also been said that "those who remember the past are condemned to 
making the opposite mistake."13 There is no way to operate with authority 
in the homeland security world without risking mistakes. Brill's book 
reminds the reader of the forces well-intentioned people encounter. 
Significant decisions have to be made in the absence of information; 
individual and organizational risks have to be taken. Politics, career issues, 
economics, networks, personal flaws, personal courage, and organizational 
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processes shaped what happened in the days after 9/11. The same 
dynamics continue to shape what we do today. I do not know a better book 
for describing those dynamics.  
Imperial Hubris: Why The West Is Losing The War on Terror, 
Michael Scheuer, writing as Anonymous.14 
"If you know the enemy and know yourself,” Sun Tzu advised centuries 
ago, “you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.” Michael Scheuer 
argues we are losing the war on terror because we fundamentally 
misunderstand the enemy and what it wants. This is a war that "has the 
potential to last beyond our children's lifetimes and to be fought mostly on 
U.S. soil." [xi]   
If you ask people who our enemy is you are likely to get the answer 
"terrorists." If you press, you will get the name al Qaeda.  If you push 
further and ask what the enemy wants, you may get something like, “they 
hate us for our freedom and they want to destroy our civilization and our 
culture.”     
Michael Scheuer was one of the first people to argue that they – radical 
Muslim terrorists – do not hate us for our freedoms; they hate our policies. 
His writing calls attention to our lack of substantive knowledge about "the 
enemy" and what they want. As a former CIA analyst, Scheuer spent 
twenty-two years in the intelligence community, eight of those years 
studying al Qaeda. For Scheuer, the nation's initial homeland security 
strategy was based on faulty assumptions.  In his view, we are fighting a 
worldwide battle against Muslim fundamentalists – not criminals or 
terrorists.   
Bin Laden, as surrogate for the broader presumed clash of Muslim and 
Judeo-Christian civilizations, has been very clear about his foreign policy 
goals:  the end to the Jewish state, the withdrawal of all U.S. and western 
military forces from the Arabian Peninsula, the end of all U.S. involvement 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the end of U.S. support for governments that 
oppress Muslims, full Muslim control over the Islamic world's energy 
resources,  and replacing U.S. backed Muslim regimes with governments 
that rule according to Islamic law. [210] 
Scheuer writes that al Qaeda will attack the nation again; the next 
assault will involve weapons of mass destruction and be larger than the 
9/11 attack. He wrote Imperial Hubris to show "there has never been a 
shortage of knowledge about the nature and immediacy of the...threat, but 
only a lack of courage to tell the truth about it fully, openly, and with 
disregard for the career-related consequences of truth telling." [xii]  
I included this book in my list of essentials because it challenges 
orthodoxy. Specifically it challenges one-dimensional thinking about the 
enemy. More generally it demonstrates important tenants of critical 
thinking: identify core assumptions, subject the assumptions to data- and 
value-based analysis and evaluation, and offer conclusions that can be 
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further exposed to critical analysis. Significant parts of homeland security 
involve learning while one is doing. Effective learning requires not only 
critical thinking, but the personal and organizational courage to challenge 
conventional wisdom. Imperial Hubris demonstrates how that can be 
done.   
Scheuer no longer works for the Central Intelligence Agency. 
America The Vulnerable, by Stephen Flynn15 
"America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a 
catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil." [iv] Steven Flynn opens his 2004 
book – America The Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing To 
Protect Us From Terrorism – with those words. Michael Scheuer 
criticized the conventional understanding of the enemy. Flynn provides 
one of the first measured critiques of the nation's strategic, policy, and 
organizational response to September 11th. "If September 11, 2001, was a 
wake up call, clearly America has fallen back asleep," he writes.  
Flynn was one of a small group who had a sense, before 9/11, of our 
nation's vulnerability to attacks. Flynn, like others who tried to get 
government to take the threat seriously, discovered that "Americans need 
a crisis to act. Nothing will change until we have a serious act of terrorism 
on U.S. soil." [xii] Flynn argues that after we were attacked, the nation 
reacted in a haphazard way, imposing poorly conceived security programs 
in an effort to do something – anything – to reassure the American public. 
His thesis in America the Vulnerable (amplified in his 2007 book The 
Edge of Disaster16) is that the nation remains unprepared for the next 
attack. In his view, the war on terror relies primarily on overseas military 
activities. The homeland has not been mobilized to confront the threat – 
whatever it might be. "Terrorism is a threat that we must constantly 
combat if we are to reduce it to manageable levels so that we can live lives 
free of fear." [xiii]   
He outlines three "simplistic" positions offered in response to the 
attacks: security at any cost (whose advocates say we should pay any price 
to prevent terrorism on our soil); a Libertarian "cure is worse than the 
disease" school that does not want to impose any restrictions on the lives 
of individuals or the market (if we do, the terrorists have already won); or 
what he calls the "Go to the Source" approach – which he believes is the 
prevailing foundation for the war on terror. [10-11]   
Flynn's primary caution is that al Qaeda has already demonstrated an 
ability to establish operations in the United States. They will do it again.  
Hence his emphasis on establishing a strong homeland security program. 
Flynn constructs a scenario of a simultaneous dirty bomb attack in New 
York, Michigan, New Jersey, Los Angeles, and Miami. He uses the scenario 
to "lament the fact that America has not spent its yesterdays preparing for 
the tomorrows that now confront the nation." [35] He believes we are in a 
"phony war," equivalent to the eight months after September 1939 when 
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the British and French declared war on Germany. Not much happened. 
Then the storm arrived. We wait for that storm today.   
Flynn argues that as a people we do not yet have the maturity to live 
with the risks of future attacks and take reasonable precautions to manage 
risks.  He devotes the middle part of his book to surveying the nation's 
most significant vulnerabilities – vulnerabilities which persist today. He 
notes that a government-only solution (i.e., DHS) fails to incorporate the 
involvement of citizens and the private sector. He then presents the 
audacious idea of replacing the current DHS-oriented national system 
with a Federal Security Reserve System, based on the political and 
organizational protocols of the Federal Reserve System (originally 
suggested by Ralph Lerner and extended by Flynn).17 It is, to the best of 
my knowledge, the only significant alternative presented to the existing, 
not very carefully thought through, structure of the current homeland 
security system.   
In our incremental society, the idea has practically no chance of 
becoming practice. DHS is going through its third reorganization in four 
years. There is little stomach for eliminating the department. But if we are 
attacked again; if the DHS system is found wanting; and if a new 
president, a new congress, and angry citizens say "Get us something 
different!" – then, perhaps, change will occur.  For now, Flynn has few 
takers for the Federal Security Reserve System.  It remains in the wings as 
a first class – and rare – example of a “big” homeland security idea. 
Flynn takes a stab at answering probably the most difficult question in 
homeland security: how much security is enough? "We have done enough 
when the American people can conclude that a future attack on U.S. soil 
will be an exceptional event that does not require wholesale changes to 
how we go about our lives. This means they should be confident that the 
measures in place are sufficient to confront the danger." [164] He closes 
the book describing seven principles he believes will help us arrive at that 
end. 
• There is no such thing as fail-safe security, and any attempt to 
achieve it will be counter productive. 
• Security must always be a work in progress. 
• Homeland Security requires forging and sustaining new 
partnerships at home and abroad. 
• Our federalist system of government is a major asset. 
• Emergency preparedness can save lives and significantly reduce the 
consequences of terrorist attacks. 
• Homeland Security activities have deterrence value. 
• Homeland Security activities will have derivative benefits for other 
public and private goods. [165-168] 
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Flynn's book is a mixture of evidence, interpretation, analysis, and 
opinion. He acknowledges that the book does not benefit from the kind of 
cautious study that characterizes traditional scholarship. It takes time and 
resources to do quality research. The homeland security research agenda is 
just getting started. Flynn acknowledges homeland security will benefit 
from the scholarly perspective that the passage of time will provide. But he 
believes time is not on our side. 
Flynn models the role reflective practitioners can play in the 
development of homeland security's intellectual topography. His work is a 
harbinger that some of the best research in this emerging field will be done 
by the people who do homeland security work and who are grounded in 
the requirements of academic argument – whether positivists, 
constructionists, subjectivists, or of other methodological predispositions. 
All that is asked is that they present their ideas in a clear fashion, identify 
their assumptions and conclusions, and provide evidence that, if not 
convincing, is at least suggestive and supportive of the conclusions they 
reach.  American the Vulnerable meets that test. 
Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, 
Preventing and Surviving Terrorism, by Mark Sauter and 
James Carafano 
One builds a professional discipline by developing a body of knowledge 
that evolves through research, practice and instruction. It is an open 
question whether homeland security will become a unique professional 
discipline, a specialization area for other professions, or turn into 
something presently unknown. The appearance of textbooks is one sign 
that a profession may be emerging.  Mark Sauter and James Carafano are 
the authors of what I consider to be the best of a small batch of homeland 
security textbooks: Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to 
Understanding, Preventing, and Surviving Terrorism.18 
The almost 500 page book is not a "complete" guide.  No work can be 
complete in this evolving enterprise. The book was written before Katrina, 
before the rise of pandemic flu concerns, and before the Second Stage (and 
now third stage) organizational changes. So there are dated parts of the 
text, such as: "The Department has four major directorates: Border and 
Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response; Science 
and Technology; and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection." 
[217] Such problems are inevitable. 
 The book is intended to be "a text for both academic and training 
courses in homeland security and terrorism." My sense is the book will be 
more useful for training programs and introductory undergraduate 
courses than for a graduate school audience. But anyone looking for a 
30,000 foot view of what constitutes homeland security can benefit from 
spending time with it.   
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The book is primarily descriptive rather than evaluative. The authors 
write that the content is designed to support the (unspecified) "learning 
objectives established by the programs and guidelines of the Department 
of Homeland Security and the United States Citizens Corps." [xvii] I have 
searched unsuccessfully for those learning objectives. I presume they exist; 
I just cannot locate them. 
The authors quickly dismiss any potential conflict over the scope of 
homeland security by pragmatically noting: "The U.S. government defines 
homeland security as the domestic effort…to defend America from 
terrorists. In practice, homeland security efforts have also come to 
comprise general preparedness under the all-hazards doctrine...." [xiv] 
Not a lot of academic parsing of ideas here; just a straight forward, "Here 
are the initial conditions; we can argue details later." 
The book is extremely well organized for an undergraduate class in 
homeland security. Each of the eighteen chapters follows the same format: 
an overview of the chapter, the learning objectives, the content, a 
summary of the content, a brief quiz that can also be used as discussion 
questions, and references. The chapters, generally more broad than deep, 
introduce readers to most of the topics that can be said to constitute a 
strict constructionist view of homeland security – i.e., homeland security 
is about terrorism. The helpfully descriptive chapter titles give one a sense 
of the breadth of the book: 
 
Part 1 – How We Got Here From There: The Emergence of Modern 
Homeland Security 
• Homeland Security: The American Tradition 
• The Rise of Modern Terrorism: The Road to 9/11 
• The Birth of Modern Homeland Security: The National Response to 
the 9/11 Attacks 
Part 2 – Understanding Terrorism 
• The Mind of the Terrorist: Why They Hate Us 
• Al-Qaeda and Other Islamic Extremist Groups: Understanding 
Fanaticism in the Name of Religion 
• The Transnational Dimensions of Terrorism: The Unique Dangers of 
the Twenty-First Century 
• Domestic Terrorist Groups: The Forgotten Threat 
• Terrorist Operations and Tactics: How Attacks are Planned and 
Executed 
• Weapons of Mass Destruction: Understanding the Great Terrorist 
Threats and Getting Beyond the Hype 
• The Digital Battlefield: Cyberterrorism and Cybersecurity 
Part 3 – Homeland Security: Organization, Strategies, Programs, and 
Principles 
• Homeland Security Roles, Responsibilities, and Jurisdictions: Federal, 
State and Local Government Responsibilities 
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• America's National Strategies: The Plans Driving the War on Global 
Terrorism and What They Mean 
• Domestic Antiterrorism and Counterterrorism: The New Role for 
States and Localities and Supporting Law Enforcement Agencies 
• Critical Infrastructure Protection and Key Assets: Protecting America's 
Most Important Targets 
• Incident Management and Emergency Management: Preparing For 
When Prevention Fails 
• Business Preparedness, Continuity, and Recovery: Private Sector 
Responses to Terrorism 
• Public Awareness and Personal and Family Preparedness: Simple 
Solutions, Serious Challenges 
• The Future of Homeland Security: Adapting and Responding to the 
Evolving Terrorist Threat While Balancing Safety and Civil Liberties 
Appendices 
• Profile of Significant Islamic Extremist and International Terrorist 
Groups and State Sponsors 
• Volunteer Services 
• The Media and Issues for Homeland Security 
• Medical and Public Health Services Emergency and Disaster Planning 
and Response: Public Health and Medical Organizations Have Unique 
and Demanding Responsibilities for Preparing and Responding to 
Terrorist Attacks 
• Preparing and Responding to Threats Against the Agriculture Sector 
The book can be criticized on several grounds. It is largely federal centric, 
and downplays the role of state and locals in intelligence and other 
homeland security domains; as described above, some of its content has 
been overtaken by events – changes in catastrophic planning, changes in 
the intelligence community, and so on. It could be significantly more 
critical of existing homeland security orthodoxy, or at least present some 
conflicting perspectives. It would benefit from a bibliography. There could 
be links to more current on-line material.  But praise for this book should 
be louder than disdain. Parts I and II have lasting value. It is friendly to 
students and teachers. It covers a lot of ground. 
As yet there is no standard homeland security text book. One day there 
will be. I consider the Sauter and Carafano book essential because it 
illustrates what a good introductory homeland security textbook should 
have:  broad coverage to show the scope of the field, clear and informative 
writing, specific learning objectives, and activities that can be used to 
determine whether those objectives have been achieved.   
The essential character of this book rests not so much in its content but 
in its structure and presentation. There may be better introductory 
textbooks in the future. This is the one they will have to surpass. 
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Catastrophe, Preparation and Prevention for Law 
Enforcement Professionals, by Craig Baldwin, Larry Irons, and 
Philip Palin19 
The previously mentioned book is for people who want to understand the 
issues and ideas in homeland security. Catastrophe, Preparation and 
Prevention is intended more for people who want to know what to do with 
those ideas. The book (workbook, actually) is designed for practitioners, 
especially those at state and local levels. While this book is written 
primarily for law enforcement, it would be useful for practically any public 
safety first responder who has some homeland security involvement. It is, 
according to the material in the book, the first in a series of similar 
workbooks for fire services, emergency medical, and others. 
Prevention is the first priority of the national strategy for homeland 
security. But what does one do when one is preventing terrorism? As of 
yet, there is no national strategy for prevention, unlike the ones for 
response or for protecting critical infrastructure. This book describes a set 
of principles that can be used to prevent or mitigate a catastrophic attack 
in one's community. The workbook is based on a prevention model first 
developed by DHS in its 2003 prevention guidelines.20 The model was 
derived inductively by asking first responders what they do when they 
prevent certain kinds of terrorist attacks. The research generated five 
general prevention areas: identifying threats, sharing information, 
collaborating with others, managing risks, and then intervening. 
Building on this model, the 150 page workbook seeks to teach police 
officers the basics of prevention. The book is visually appealing; its content 
is part theory, part practice, and part fill-in-the-blanks with one's own 
experiences. The book comes with a compact disk that contains dozens of 
homeland security documents.   
The book is also linked to an on-line exercise where the reader gets the 
opportunity to test his or her skill in relation to what is taught in the book. 
For example, after completing the unit on recognizing threats, the reader 
is directed to the exercise with the following directions: 
It is now 9 months before a planned terrorist attack.  The threat is 
organizing, planning and becoming real. Can you identify the most 
probable targets [in the fictional community used in the exercise] 
and their vulnerabilities based on the perceived threat? ....Your 
efforts to collaborate and share information are paying off. You are 
receiving information from local, federal and international law 
enforcement agencies. But, even with this information, you must 
make threat and vulnerability choices. [46] 
After the chapter on risk management, the exercise progresses: "It is now 
about 3 months before the attack.... You and your team are ready to 
identify and assess the risks associated with this threat.... Three... 
lieutenants will present their risk management strategies. Can you 
correctly identify their strength and weaknesses?" [116]  
BELLAVI T A, CH ANGING HOMELAND SECURI TY 
HO MELAND SECURI TY  AFFAIR S,  VOL. III,  NO. 1 (FEBR UAR Y  2007) H TT P://WWW.H S AJ.OR G 
15 
It all sounds a bit contrived, but from a learning perspective it seems to 
work. I went through the on-line exercise and learned something about 
prevention. 
(Disclosure: I participated on a review board for McGraw Hill when it 
was considering whether to undertake this workbook, and I participated in 
helping to develop one of the concepts used in the workbook. A company I 
have a relationship with has the potential to benefit financially, in a minor 
way, from sales of the workbook. These facts normally should exclude 
someone – in this case me – from writing a review about the book. In spite 
of that, I still think this workbook demonstrates an important blended 
learning approach to practitioner-oriented homeland security education.) 
One can disagree with some of the conceptual choices made by the 
authors – in their framing of the prevention equation, for example, or in 
their focus on terrorism rather than all hazards. I disagree with their use of 
"decide to intervene" rather than “intervene.” But I think this book is 
essential in the way it approaches practitioner learning. Documents from 
the national strategy on down, and leaders from the president on down, 
have talked about prevention as the first priority in securing the 
homeland. This workbook is the only book I know that treats that priority 
in a serious and operationally useful way. In doing so, it sets a mark that 
future efforts to teach practitioners will have to reach. 
Trapped in the War on Terror, by Ian S. Lustick 
The War on Terror itself, not al Qaeda or its offshoots, "has become the 
primary threat to the well-being of Americans in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. My fundamental conclusion is that the War on Terror 
is vastly out of proportion to the actual problems we face from terrorists 
and terrorists groups." [6] Trapped in the War on Terror21 details how Ian 
Lustick reached this conclusion. He asserts: 
The War on Terror's record of failure, with its inevitable and 
spectacular instances of venality and waste, will humiliate 
thousands of public servants and elected officials, demoralize 
citizens, and enrage taxpayers. The effort to master the unlimited 
catastrophes we can imagine by mobilizing the scarce resources we 
actually have will drain our economy, divert and distort military, 
intelligence, and law enforcement resources, undermine faith in 
our institutions, and fundamentally disturb our way of life. In this 
way the terrorists who struck us so hard on September 11, 2001, 
can use our own defensive efforts to do us much greater harm than 
they could ever do themselves. [ix-x] 
It takes Lustick 145 pages to unfurl compelling – if occasionally polemical 
and not always thoroughly convincing – evidence to support his assertion. 
He begins by describing the role triage ought to play in deciding how to 
use scarce homeland security resources. "If we do not systematically 
evaluate threats, we will end up worrying about all conceivable 
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vulnerabilities. By this logic, our resources will be the only limit to 
investments in our security, leading to a frenzy of impossibly huge 
outlays." [3]   
Lustick argues we do not have an effective way to determine which 
potential threats are serious enough to attend to. What he calls an "all-
azimuth threat of terrorism" makes it difficult to reject rationally any 
suggestion for being better prepared.  There is always something more one 
can do to prevent or get ready for an attack. One is always open to 
criticism after the fact if one knew about a potential threat yet did nothing 
about it. He offers a more conspiratorial explanation that the all-azimuth 
vision results from the "paranoia unleashed after the 9/11 attacks" that is 
being exploited by certain special interest groups and individuals. The 
latter explanation constitutes a significant part of his argument (as 
Lustick's essay elsewhere in this issue outlines). The bulk of the book is a 
well structured argument that looks at the causes and consequences of the 
homeland security world he sees. He closes his analysis with seven ideas 
he thinks can "free Americans from the War on Terror." 
Chapter 2, "Perceptions of the Terrorist Threat" discusses what 
Americans believe about the threat of terrorism and why they hold those 
beliefs. Chapter 3 looks at the evidence of the supposed threat. Lustick 
concludes that there is "very little evidence, hard or soft, that 'terrorist 
groups with global reach' are operating in the United States with plans to 
use deadly force either catastrophically or non-catastrophically in attacks 
against American targets." [29] Lustick does not contend there is no threat 
[46].  He argues the threat is – in the words of another book that makes a 
similar point – "overblown.” 22  
Lustick uses Chapter 4 to explain why the War on Terror is out of hand. 
The array of slogans, bureaucracies, lobbying strategies, wars, 
budgets, contracts, books, television shows, films, cottage 
industries, and academic centers that makes up the War on Terror 
has come to operate as a self-organizing, self-perpetuating 
whirlwind – a veritable hurricane of public policies and private 
ambitions that feed on one another and on the impossibility of any 
outcome we could know as 'victory.' [48]   
He blames the "actions of a very specific, energetic, well-organized, and 
well-positioned group" for transforming "the national response to the 9/11 
attacks from a rational and direct action" against al Qaeda "to a crusade 
for the implementation of its own long-cherished blueprint for a new kind 
of America and a new kind of American role in the world." [49]   
Chapter 5 describes the War on Terror Whirlwind.  Lustick argues we 
are in what seems to be a permanent national emergency. We have been at 
threat level Yellow since the advisory system started; airports remain at 
Orange. The perceived emergency has engulfed the country in a whirlwind 
of homeland security activities, "none of which can ever be proven 
successful, but all of which can be criticized as inadequate." [71] He 
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contends "chasing dollars and grinding axes" drives the whirlwind. 
Organizations are more likely to receive government funding if they can 
frame their interests and mission within a homeland security context. 
District attorneys, veterinarians, the pharmaceutical industry, 
pediatricians, psychologists, pro-gun groups, anti-gun groups, airlines, 
unions, insurance companies, housing groups, and a growing list of other 
special interests assemble what they believe to be credible rationales for a 
nexus with homeland security. 
How do we get free of this trap? Lustick's first recommendation is to 
know the enemy and then structure our response around that knowledge. 
"Our enemies are clever and they know more about us than we do about 
them," he argues. [140] "We must ask the same questions about al Qaeda 
and its ilk that we would ask about any other opponent." [125] Like 
Scheuer, he has his own understanding about the enemy, drawn mostly 
from what they say.   
Once we know the enemy, what is to be done?  Lustick closes his book 
with seven suggestions: 
1.  Open up a debate about the logic and appropriateness of the War on 
Terror. He notes that polls typically do not ask the American people 
whether we should have a War on Terrorism. He believes it will be 
difficult to get this conversation started. 
2. Treat terrorists as "the dangerous but politically insignificant 
criminals they would be without our help." [137] 
3. Treat terrorism fundamentally as a law enforcement problem; 
address the problem with "well-funded, sustained, disciplined, 
professional, aggressive, internationally cooperative...efforts 
employed to pursue, prosecute, and punish criminals." [139] 
4. Work, long term, to build societies that are sufficiently satisfying and 
resilient to mitigate the growth of terrorism. 
5. Establish levels of acceptable terrorism risks, using reasonable and 
cost effective measures to reduce unacceptable risks. 
6. Learn to manage the fear terrorism seeks to create. "Stare straight 
into the face of the possibility that our country could be hit by a 
nuclear [or other catastrophic] terrorist attack," he says. [144] But 
"remember that we can and will recover from such a blow."[145] 
7. "Choose the leaders we deserve, not only to escape the War on Terror 
trap but to protect ourselves from the real threats we face.” [145] 
Is Lustick correct? Have we created a self organizing monster that 
continues to grow and consume ever more resources? The Department of 
Homeland Security's budget is one of the few domestic policy budgets that 
are growing. Why is that? Is the threat so immediately malignant that we 
need to remain on full alert? Are our vulnerabilities so broad and 
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menacing that we need to continue spending regardless of the costs it 
imposes on policy domains not connected to homeland security? We have 
been at this homeland security business for more than five years. Lustick 
responsibly asks whether we are on the right path. People seriously 
thoughtful about the security of the American homeland need to engage 
his argument with equal care. 
Unconquerable Nation, by Brian Jenkins23  
Unconquerable Nation combines into one volume some of homeland 
security's best writing, scholarship, history, critical thinking, pragmatism, 
personal opinion, and political acumen. The book draws its title – and its 
central analytical premise – from one of Sun Tzu's less well-known 
aphorisms: "Being unconquerable lies with yourself."  
"Let us keep the threat in perspective," Jenkins argues (although not as 
zealously as Lustick). "We have in our history faced far worse threats. Our 
lives are not in grave danger. The republic is not in peril. We must not 
overreact." [177] 
Like Scheuer, Flynn, and others, Jenkins argues that our strategy in the 
struggle against terrorism  
[M]ust be based on a thorough understanding of the enemy and of 
one’s own strengths and weaknesses. 'Being unconquerable' 
means knowing oneself, but as understood by the ancient 
strategists, 'knowing' means much more than the mere acquisition 
of knowledge. 'Knowing oneself' means preserving one’s spirit, a 
broad term. 'Being unconquerable' includes not only disciplined 
troops and strong walls, but also confidence, courage, 
commitment—the opposite of terror and fear. [5] 
Jenkins – who has been involved in terrorism research for almost forty 
years – believes we can successfully defeat the threat of terrorism and 
preserve our liberty and our values. He argues that  
[T]oday's fierce partisanship has reduced national politics to a 
gang war. The constant maneuvering for narrow political 
advantage, the rejection of criticism as disloyalty, the pursuit by 
interest groups of their own exclusive agendas, and the radio, 
television, newspaper, and Internet debates that thrive on 
provocation and partisan zeal provide a poor platform for the 
difficult and sustained effort that America faces. All of these trends 
imperil the sense of community required to withstand the struggle 
ahead. We don’t need unanimity. We do need unity. Democracy is 
our strength. Partisanship is our weakness. [17] 
The book is about terrorists and homeland security. The first two chapters 
review the progress of the terrorism wars from the immediate post-9/11 
days through current insurgent activities in Iraq.  
It is evident that this conflict will not be decided in the near future 
but will persist...for decades, during which setbacks will be 
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obvious and progress will be hard to measure. Beyond al Qaeda, 
we confront a protracted ideological conflict, of which the terrorist 
campaign waged by disconnected jihadists is a symptom.... 
Preparing for this long war will require a deeper understanding of 
the challenge we confront and the formulation of a set of strategic 
principles to guide our actions. [51]    
Identifying these principles for both the international and domestic fronts 
is the heart of Jenkins' book.   
Chapter Three is another effort to "know the enemy." The terrorism 
debate is shaped on the one hand by seeing the enemy easily as evil people 
who hate our way of life and on the other by a more complex view of an 
enemy with clear foreign policy objectives. Jenkins writes, as did Scheuer 
and Lustick, "If you want to know what enemy leaders are thinking about, 
listen to what they have to say." [61]  
Jenkins reviews some of the common misperceptions about the enemy, 
and then focuses on their words. One intriguing feature of the chapter is 
an analysis of the jihadist ideology and three generations of jihadist 
leaders. He concludes that   
[The jihadist] words are a narrative aimed at the home front, 
intended above all to incite action. They convey a message that has 
resonance and undeniable appeal. .... [T]he jihadists’ actions are 
aimed at maintaining unity and attracting more recruits.... This 
fight will go on for a long time, especially if we fail to see it through 
their eyes. But once we do, we can formulate a new set of strategic 
principles better suited to the conflict. [109]  
Another section especially worth reading is a hypothetical briefing given to 
Osama bin Laden about how al Qaeda and the jihad are doing, five years 
after the attack on American soil. 
Chapter Four outlines the principles Jenkins suggests should govern 
our approach to this struggle. They include destroying the global jihadist 
enterprise, conserving resources for a decades long war, waging the 
political war against the jihadist ideology more effectively, breaking the 
cycle of jihadism, maintaining international cooperation, maintaining a 
narrower view of preemption, and reserving the right to retaliate 
(massively if necessary) in response to an attack. 
Chapter Five presents the implications of Jenkins' argument for 
homeland security. The chapter opens with a unique photographic image 
of the Statue of Liberty and the torch she holds in her right hand. Under 
the picture are the words "The defense of democracy demands the defense 
of democracy's ideals."   
Like Lustick, Jenkins asks: how did America become so afraid?   
Fear is the biggest danger we face. Fear can erode confidence in our 
institutions, provoke us to overreact, tempt us to abandon our 
values. There is nothing wrong with being afraid, but we have spent 
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the past five years scaring the hell out of ourselves.  We need to 
spend the next several years doing things very differently. [153]  
His suggestions about what to do differently are not especially new. Yet 
they add to a growing perception that we know we can be doing better in 
homeland security. But the political will to make those changes happen 
has yet to emerge.   
Jenkins recommends getting realistic about risk: "Since 9/11, most 
Americans have exaggerated the danger posed by terrorist attacks. This is 
because spectacular events, not statistics, drive our perceptions."[154] He 
adds his voice to those who want to get citizens more actively involved in 
preparedness activities:  
The federal government does not provide homeland security. 
Citizens do.... Security is a fundamental human right, but it should 
not become an individual entitlement. Americans are going to 
have to accept a measure of risk, even if the risk is minuscule, as 
we have seen. Yet the acceptance of risk should never become an 
excuse for negligence. [158]   
Accomplishing this aim, as Jenkins describes it, will require more than an 
inadequately funded Citizen Corps. 
His other recommendations include becoming more sophisticated 
about security, about what it can and cannot do; favoring security 
investments that help rebuild the nation's physical and social 
infrastructure; improving state and local intelligence capabilities; building 
a better legal framework to improve our ability to prevent attacks while 
respecting civil liberties; and ensuring effective judicial and legislative 
homeland security oversight. 
Jenkins’ final principle for redirecting homeland security efforts is to 
preserve American values. One often hears that the Constitution is not a 
suicide pact.24 Jenkins confronts that concern: 
Maintaining our values may at times be inconvenient. It may 
mean, in some circumstances, accepting additional risks, but 
America has fought wars to defend what its citizens regard as 
inalienable rights. The country has faced dangers greater than all 
of the terrorists in the world put together. Neither the terrorists 
nor those who would promise us protection against terror should 
cause us to compromise our commitments. The current campaign 
against terrorism is a contest not only of strength and will, but also 
of conviction, commitment, and courage. It will ultimately 
determine who will live in fear. The choice, ultimately, is our own. 
I believe that we can win, and we can win right. [176] 
The sentiment Jenkins expresses is essential to homeland security. 
Jenkins argues that our most effective defense against terrorism will come 
from "our own virtue, our courage, our continued dedication to the ideals 
of a free society." [176] My final candidate for essential homeland security 
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work is a trinitarian reminder of what those ideals are: The Declaration 
of Independence, The Articles of Confederation, and The 
Constitution of the United States of America. 
The Declaration of Independence asserts, without providing footnotes, 
citations or other supporting evidence, that certain truths are self-evident: 
"that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and 
the Pursuit of Happiness – That to secure these rights Governments are 
instituted among Men.... " But when government "becomes destructive of 
these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to 
institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and 
organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to 
effect their Safety and Happiness." 
Our nation's roots spring from a revolution against illegitimate 
authority. But we have come a long way from Patrick Henry's "Give me 
liberty or give me death" to the unquestioning acceptance of "You are 
required to remove your shoes before you enter the walk-through metal 
detector."25   
The Declaration reminds us that government's authority is derived 
from the consent of the governed. Governments take silence as consent. 
More people voted in 2006 for American Idol than have ever voted for a 
president.26 The right combination of issue, incident, fear, and demagogue 
could radically alter the kind of nation we pass on to our children. If we 
perceive our safety is in jeopardy, we can change our laws.  The rapid 
passage of the 300 plus page USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 – signed six 
weeks after the 9/11 attacks – demonstrated government can act quickly, 
more quickly than the Founders envisioned. New laws can enshrine new 
"self-evident" values. 
I included the Articles of Confederation And Perpetual Union as a 
fundamental homeland security document because it reminds us that we 
did not get it right the first time we tried to form a government. We can 
make, acknowledge, and correct error.    
The Articles were written during the war in 1776, adopted in 1777, and 
ratified by the states in 1781. This pact of Perpetual Union did not attend 
to the practical realities of financing and administering a nation. Instead 
of continually trying to modify the Articles until they got it right, the 
Founders had the political courage to start over again. The Articles of 
Confederation remind us that we should not exclude the possibility of 
rethinking, as a nation, how we approach homeland security. There are 
strong arguments to be made that the practice of homeland security is 
unnecessarily large and overly complex for the actual task we face. 
According to that perspective, expenditures are precariously out of balance 
with the threat. Our current confederation of homeland security activities 
risk – as bin Laden predicted in his October 2004 videotape – "continuing 
this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy." 27  
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The Constitution of the United States – and the more than 200 year 
history of interpreting that document – is, and ought to provide, the 
foundational understanding of what it means to participate in this nation. 
Samuel Adams wrote:  
The liberties of our country, the freedoms of our civil Constitution 
are worth defending at all hazards; it is our duty to defend them 
against all attacks. We have received them as a fair inheritance 
from our worthy ancestors. They purchased them for us with toil 
and danger and expense of treasure and blood. It will bring a mark 
of everlasting infamy on the present generation – enlightened as it 
is – if we should suffer them to be wrested from us by violence 
without a struggle, or to be cheated out of them by the artifices of 
designing men.  
The Constitution reminds us that our continually emerging, perpetually 
incomplete, task is to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure 
domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty.  Those are essential 
principles around which to secure the American homeland. 
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